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I.

Introduction and Background on the ICC

The International Criminal Court (ICC) was created in 1998, and
it became operational in 2002. 1 The ICC was established during a time
period of significant movement in the field of international criminal law:
the Yugoslavia and Rwanda tribunals were established in 1993 and 1994
respectively, through Security Council resolutions, and the creation of
a permanent international criminal court was viewed as complementary
to the existing ad hoc accountability mechanisms. 2 The creation of
the ICC was followed by the establishment of further ad hoc tribunals,
such as the Special Court for Sierra Leone, the Extraordinary Chambers
in the Courts of Cambodia, and the Special Tribunal for Lebanon.3
*

The Charles R. Emrick Jr. – Calfee Halter & Griswold Professor of Law,
Cleveland-Marshall College of Law. The author would like to thank
participants of the Frederick K. Cox Center, Case Western Reserve
University School of Law conference on “Atrocity Prevention: The Role
of International Law and Justice” for the opportunity to present a version
of these remarks.

1

See Mark Tran, Background: International Criminal Court, THE
GUARDIAN
(Jan.
26,
2019),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/jan/26/internationalcriminal-court [https://perma.cc/6LPM-F226]. For a detailed history
about the ICC’s establishment, see About the Court, COALITION FOR THE
INT’L
CRIM.
CT.,
http://iccnow.org/?mod=icchistory
[https://perma.cc/SDS8-X5KF].

2.

For a discussion of the ICTY’s and the ICTR’s impact on the ICC, see
Stuart Ford, The Impact of the Ad Hoc Tribunals on the International
Criminal Court, in THE LEGACY OF AD HOC TRIBUNALS IN INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW 307–09 (Milena Sterio & Michael P. Scharf eds., 2019).

3.

Id. at 311–12.
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Thus, the ICC’s birth can be situated within a period of activism in
international criminal law, resulting in the creation of new
accountability mechanisms focused on the prevention and punishment
of atrocity crimes.
The ICC was originally viewed as an enormous success for the field
of international criminal law, and for the proposition that those who
commit atrocity crimes should face individual criminal responsibility.
“The court’s mere existence has . . . served as a catalyst for
accountability.” 4 The initial enthusiasm for the court has significantly
waned over the past two decades, in light of the court’s weak record of
convictions, the ongoing turmoil among the court’s judges, as well as
the court’s contentious relationship with some of the world’s powers,
including the United States. 5 At the 17th Assembly of States Parties,
the United Kingdom publicly criticized the court for its alleged failure
to meet expectations set at the Rome Statute negotiations in 1998.6
According to the United Kingdom’s statement at the ASP, “[W]e
cannot bury our heads in the sand and pretend everything is fine when
it isn’t. The statistics are sobering. After [nearly] 20 years, and 1.5
billion Euros spent we have only three core crime convictions.” 7
The following section will describe some of the most significant
challenges that the ICC is currently facing, in order to assess how
serious the court’s current struggles are in light of its core mission of
ending impunity.

II. ICC and Current Challenges
The ICC is currently facing significant challenges which may put
the court’s legitimacy into question. These challenges include a weak
record of prosecutions, discord among the court’s judges, and a difficult
relationship with the world’s great powers, such as Russia and the
United States.
First, the ICC has been in existence for seventeen years; since its
inception, the court has successfully convicted only eight defendants. 8

4.

James A. Goldston, Don’t Give Up on the ICC, FOREIGN POLICY (Aug.
8, 2019), https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/08/08/dont-give-up-on-the-icchague-war-crimes/ [https://perma.cc/PHS4-8XGP].

5.

See generally id.

6.

Foreign & Commonwealth Office, UK Statement to ICC Assembly of
Session,
UK.GOV
(Dec.
5,
2018),
States
Parties
17th
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/uk-statement-to-iccassembly-of-states-parties-17th-session [https://perma.cc/QM7T-AL72].

7.

Id.

8.

Douglas Guilfoyle, Part I – This is not Fine: The International Criminal
TALK
(Mar.
21,
2019),
Court
in
Trouble,
EJIL:
http://www.ejiltalk.org/part-i-this-is-not-fine-the-international-criminal-
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Out of the eight convictions, one has been overturned on appeal
(Bemba), one resulted from a guilty plea (Al Mahdi), and four resulted
from Article 70 administration of justice offenses. 9 The latter four
offenses all arise out of the Central African Republic investigation and
involve light sentences of 6 months to 3 years. 10 The remaining
convictions for core crimes include Katanga (DRC), who was sentenced
to 12 years but was ultimately transferred back to DRC custody with
“sentence served” after only 8 years; Lubanga (DRC), who was
sentenced to 14 years, and Al Mahdi (Mali), who pled guilty and was
sentenced to 9 years. 11 Most recently, the ICC Trial Chamber convicted
an additional defendant, Ntaganda. 12 Of several charges of crimes
against humanity and war crimes; as of today, this defendant has not
been sentenced but it is safe to assume that the imposed sentence will
be serious, in light of the gravity of crimes for which Ntaganda was
convicted. 13
It would be imprudent to criticize the court for not convicting all
defendants – all courts are supposed to respect defense rights, to operate
on the presumption of innocence for all defendants, and it is rare for
any court to have a 100 percent conviction rate. However, it is possible
to criticize the court’s prosecutor for initiating so few prosecutions and
for presenting weak cases. In the Gbagbo case in particular, which
resulted in an acquittal, the Trial Chamber lambasted the Office of the
Prosecutor (“OTP” or “Prosecutor”) for having presented such a
disorganized and weak case. 14 In Gbagbo, the prosecutor struggled from
the beginning. 15 At the confirmation of charges stage, the Pre-Trial
Chamber criticized the prosecutor for attempting to build its case of
crimes against humanity based on hearsay evidence from NGO reports
and press articles. 16 The Pre-Trial Chamber gave the prosecutor five
extra months to collect additional evidence which would withstand

court-in-trouble [https://perma.cc/6YAY-QVMD] [hereinafter Guilfoyle,
This is not Fine – Part I].
9.

Id.

10.

Id.

11.

Id.

12.

See Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, ICC-01/04-02/06, Judgment, ¶ 1203
(July 8, 2019).

13.

Id.

14.

Thijs Bouwknegt, Gbagbo – An Acquittal Foretold, JUSTICEINFO.NET
(Jan. 31, 2019), https://www.justiceinfo.net/en/tribunals/icc/40156gbagbo-an-acquittal-foretold.html [https://perma.cc/NV6Q-K6W7].

15.

Id.

16.

Id.
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scrutiny and result in the confirmation of charges against Gbagbo.17
During Gbagbo’s trial, the prosecution called multiple witnesses and
presented thousands of pages of documents, but was unable to link
Gbagbo to the violence that took place in Cote d’Ivoire. 18 At the close
of trial, which took several years, the trial chamber asked the prosecutor
to submit an additional brief which would explain and better organize
all of the evidence which the OTP had submitted during trial. 19 And
on January 15, 2019, the Trial Chamber acquitted Gbagbo, after it
granted a no case to answer motion at the end of the prosecution’s
case. 20
The Trial Chamber was exceptionally critical of the
prosecution. 21 Judges criticized the prosecutor for her poor handling of
the physical evidence, her reliance on hearsay testimony, and her
distorted evidence gathering. 22 In addition, Trial Chamber judges were
critical of the prosecutor’s overly complex case theory; Judge Henderson
observed that “[t]he prosecutor’s narrative is largely internally coherent
and prima facie plausible,” and that she lacked “almost any direct
evidence for her version of events” and thus “advanced an elaborate
and multi-faceted evidentiary argument that is built almost entirely
upon circumstantial evidence.” 23 And Judge Tarfusser referred to the
prosecutor’s approach as “a vortex of circularity, self-reference and
repetition that has not made the Chamber’s task any easier.” 24 Trial
Chamber judges also criticized the prosecutor for her filings, poor
courtroom technique and management of the courtroom time. 25 The
Gbagbo prosecution has been referred to as a “fiasco” by former ICC
judge Christine Van Den Wyngaert. 26 As Douglas Guilfoyle has noted,
“the circumstances of the acquittal would appear a stinging rebuke.” 27
Moreover, it may be argued that a weak court delivering so few
convictions has fallen short of its goals of fighting impunity and
17.

Id.

18.

Id.

19.

Id.

20.

Bouwknegt, supra note 14.

21.

Douglas Guilfoyle, A Tale of Two Cases: Lessons for the Prosecutor of
the International Criminal Court (Part II), EJIL: TALK! (Aug. 29, 2019),
http://www.ejiltalk.org/a-tale-of-two-cases-lessons-for-the-prosecutor-ofthe-international-criminal-court-part-ii/
[https://perma.cc/7MAH5X6M] [hereinafter Guilfoyle, A Tale of Two Cases – Part II].

22.

Id.

23.

Id.

24.

Id.

25.

Id.

26.

Bouwknegt, supra note 14.

27.

Douglas Guilfoyle, A Tale of Two Cases – Part II, supra note 21.
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deterring the commission of atrocity crimes. “However, to the extent
that the Court is meant to serve expressivist goals, fight impunity, or
deter atrocity – it must present some credible threat to those who
should fear accountability. It is often argued that the simple possibility
of ICC accountability may deter atrocity that the existence of
institutions may change behaviour.” 28
In addition to the above, several of the prosecutor’s investigations
and prosecutions have been unsuccessful. Gbagbo, whose case is
mentioned directly above, as well as his aid were both acquitted at trial;
the Kenyan cases involving Kenyatta and Ruto fell apart before trial,
and the opening of the Afghanistan investigation was recently rejected
by one of the court’s pretrial chambers. 29 As Jim Goldston has noted,
“something is wrong when a court created to “put an end to impunity”
for “the most serious crimes,” that deals with a handful of cases at a
cost well in excess of $150 million per year, produces more acquittals
and dismissals of charges than convictions.” 30
Second, the ICC’s judges have displayed a level of discord among
themselves, have been inconsistent in their application of substantive
law, and some judges have been publicly embroiled in a salary dispute.31
All of these issues may contribute to a negative perception of the court
as a failed institution. It appears that ICC judges do not get along.32
According to Guilfoyle, “there are very worrying signs of a breakdown
in collegiality among the ICC judges which is damaging both the formal
coherence of court decisions and its wider legitimacy.” 33 Recently, such
discord has escalated to a higher level when Judge Ibanez Carranza
dissented from a decision assigning a different judge to preside over an
appeal (Judge Ibanez Carranza complained that she had never been
28.

Guilfoyle, This is not Fine – Part I, supra note 8.

29.

Dionne Searcey & Palko Karasz, Laurent Gbagbo, Former Ivory Coast
Leader, Acquitted of Crimes Against Humanity, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 15,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/15/world/africa/laurentgbagbo-ivory-coast-icc.html
[https://perma.cc/WY2A-FN8G];
ICC
Drops Uhuru Kenyatta Charges for Kenya Ethnic Violence, BBC NEWS
(Dec.
5,
2014), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-30347019
[https://perma.cc/2RDC-V4BU]; ICC Judges Reject Opening of an
Investigation Regarding Afghanistan Situation, INT’L CRIM. CT. (Apr. 12,
2019),
https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=pr1448
[https://perma.cc/P5UM-AG3N].

30.

Goldston, supra note 4.

31.

Douglas Guilfoyle, Part III – This is not Fine: The International Criminal
TALK!
(Mar.
25,
2019),
Court
in
Trouble,
EJIL:
https://www.ejiltalk.org/part-iii-this-is-not-fine-the-internationalcriminal-court-in-trouble/ [perma.cc/4FQD-7ZS7] [hereinafter Guilfoyle,
This is not Fine – Part III].

32.

Id.

33.

Id.
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assigned to preside over an appeal). 34 Her dissent was rebutted by a
joint declaration by the ICC President and Judge Hofmanski, and
Judge Ibanez Carranza then publicly characterized the issuance of such
a joint declaration as a potential abuse of administrative functions.35
As Kevin Jon Heller observed, “you know things are bad at the Court
when disagreements over presiding judge appointments is spilling out
into the public.” 36
In addition to displaying public animosity toward one another, ICC
judges have been divided in their application of the law, resulting in
inconsistent judgements and contributing toward uncertainty in the
definition and development of legal norms in the field of international
criminal law. For example, in the Ruto and Sang “no case to answer”
decision, the Trial Chamber announced its decision through a reference
to separate opinions which gave different reasons for decision. 37 This
“appears to signal a breakdown of the deliberative process if those who
agreed on the outcome could not agree on a common set of reasons.” 38
Moreover, Judge van den Wyngaert wrote a scathing dissent from the
Trial Chamber judgment in Katanga, to which Judges Cotte and Diarra
responded in a joint separate opinion, and Judges Tafusser and
Trendafilova dissented strongly from the Appeals Chamber judgment
in Ngudjolo and Chui. 39 And Judges van den Wyngaert and Morrison,in
the Bemba Appeal, accused their colleagues from the Trial Chamber of
not attaching enough importance to the strict application of the burden
34.

Kevin Jon Heller, Well, the Gbagbo “No Case to Answer” Appeal Should
JURIS
(Jan.
22,
2019),
Be
Interesting,
OPINIO
http://opiniojuris.org/2019/01/22/well-the-gbagbo-no-case-to-answerappeal-should-be-interesting/ [perma.cc/2UM7-C9DU].

35.

Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo and Charles Blé Goudé, ICC-02/11-01/15
OA14, Joint Declaration of Judge Eboe-Osuji and Judge Hofmański on
the Procedure on the Election of Presiding Judges, ¶ 3 (Jan. 22, 2019),
available
at
https://www.icccpi.int/RelatedRecords/CR2019_00213.PDF [perma.cc/HQE6-A8DQ];
Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo and Charles Blé Goudé , ICC-02/11-01/151242-Anx3, Statement of Judge Ibáñez Carranza with respect to the Joint
Declaration of the President of the Court and the President of the Appeals
Division on the Procedure on the Election of Presiding Judges, ¶ 2 (Jan.
24,
2019),
available
at
https://www.icccpi.int/RelatedRecords/CR2019_00303.PDF [perma.cc/E367-MTN2].

36.

Heller, supra note 34.

37.

See generally Prosecutor v. Ruto and Sang, ICC-01/09-01/11, Decision on
Defence Applications for Judgments of Acquittal, ¶¶ 147–150 (Apr. 5,
2016).

38.

Guilfoyle, A Tale of Two Cases – Part II, supra note 21.

39.

Hemi Mistry, The Significance of Institutional Culture in Enhancing the
Validity of International Criminal Tribunals, 17 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 17
(2017).
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and standard of proof and to the due process rights of the accused. 40
While some of the judicial disagreement in terms of substantive law can
be attributed to the fact that the court’s judges come from different
countries and legal traditions, it can also be observed that judges from
other ad hoc tribunals (most notably the ICTY) also came from diverse
backgrounds but were nonetheless able to come to an agreement
regarding substantive law in a significant number of cases. 41 Moreover,
it may also be argued that while some disagreement and dissent among
judges is permissible and does not signal a lack of collegiality, the
above-mentioned strongly worded dissents, where judges accuse one
another of unfairness or of having acted ultra vires, does display a level
of animosity which threatens to undermine the ICC’s perceived
legitimacy. Additionally, the lack of consensus over substantive law
among ICC judges is damaging to the court because this disables the
court from developing coherent jurisprudence on difficult or novel legal
issues stemming from the Rome Statute. “The result is a mess for
anyone attempting to discern what the applicable law on point is at the
ICC….” 42
In addition, some ICC judges have been involved in a pseudo-public
dispute over their salaries. 43 While these judges may have valid claims
regarding their compensation, this type of a dispute contributes to a
largely negative perception of the court as an elite institution whose
members are out of tune with reality.
Third, the ICC has had a difficult relationship with the world’s
superpowers, including Russia, China, and the United States. 44 Russia
and China have repeatedly vetoed draft Security Council resolutions
which would have referred the Syrian situation to the ICC. 45 And
because of increased polarization within the Security Council, Russia
and China opposing the United States, the prospects of any future
Security Council referrals are slim. 46 In addition, the ICC had a difficult
40.

Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ICC-01/05-01/08-3636-Anx2,
Separate Opinion Judge Christine Van den Wyngaert and Judge Howard
Morrison, ¶ 4 (June 8, 2018), available at https://www.icccpi.int/RelatedRecords/CR2018_02989.PDF [/perma.cc/YS3H-8H3W].

41.

Id.

42.

Guilfoyle, A Tale of Two Cases – Part II, supra note 21.

43.

Janet Anderson, Money Matters at the ICC, JUSTICEINFO.NET (Dec. 14,
2018),
https://www.justiceinfo.net/en/tribunals/icc/39771-moneymatters-at-the-icc.html [perma.cc/27UM-795J].

44.

Goldston, supra note 4.

45.

HAMMARSKJÖLD
LIBRARY,
See
Veto
List,
DAG
https://research.un.org/en/docs/sc/quick [perma.cc/N2XN-HVDY].

46.

See CLAUS KREß, PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS ON THE ICC APPEALS
CHAMBER’S JUDGMENT OF 6 MAY 2019 IN THE JORDAN REFERRAL RE ALBASHIR APPEAL 21 (2019) (ebook).
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relationship with the United States during the George W. Bush
administration; during this time, the United States passed the
American Servicemembers Protection Act of 2002, which was intended
to prohibit American cooperation with the ICC. 47 Moreover, the United
States concluded multiple-bilateral agreements with different countries,
in order to ensure the latter would not extradite US nationals found
within such countries to the court. 48 These agreements effectively
precluded signatory countries from cooperating with the ICC in matters
of extradition, and have weakened the court’s ability to execute arrest
warrants against some indicted individuals. 49 More recently, the Trump
Administration has displayed overt hostility toward the court. John
Bolton, who at the time served as National Security Advisor, lambasted
the court and accused it of having “no jurisdiction, no legitimacy, no
authority.” 50 Bolton announced that the United States would revoke
visas for the ICC personnel, and even threatened that such personnel
could be arrested if present in the United States. 51 Although John
Bolton no longer serves in the Trump Administration, it is unclear that
the administration’s view toward the court will improve. 52 In addition
to the world’s superpowers, other countries have not been cooperative
with the ICC. In 2009 and 2010, the court issued two arrest warrants
for Al-Bashir, who at the time served as President of Sudan. 53 Since
then, Al-Bashir has been able to travel to multiple other countries,
including some ICC member states, all of which failed to arrest him

47.

U.S.: ‘Hague Invasion Act’ Becomes Law, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Aug.
3, 2002), https://www.hrw.org/news/2002/08/03/us-hague-invasion-actbecomes-law [perma.cc/K2LC-ZGSL].

48.

Q & A: The International Criminal Court and the United States, HUMAN
RIGHTS
WATCH
(Mar.
15,
2019),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/03/15/qa-international-criminal-courtand-united-states#7 [perma.cc/K4LV-BMDN].

49.

See id.

50.

Id.

51.

Rebecca Gordon, Why Are We Above International Law?, THE NATION
(Mar. 26, 2019), https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/rebeccagordon-international-criminal-court-john-bolton/
[perma.cc/7XDSM8SY].

52.

Philip Ewing, Trump Fires John Bolton in Final Break After Months Of
Internal
Policy
Division,
NPR
(Sept.
10,
2019),
https://www.npr.org/2019/09/10/724363700/trump-fires-john-bolton-infinal-break-after-months-of-policy-divisions [perma.cc/C8VW-LFYV].

53.

Tom White, States ‘Failing to Seize Sudan’s Dictator Despite Genocide
GUARDIAN
(Oct.
21,
2018),
Charge,’
THE
https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2018/oct/21/omarbashir-travels-world-despite-war-crime-arrest-warrant [perma.cc/5SGMYP2F].
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and to deliver him to The Hague. 54 At the 2017 Assembly of States
Parties, ICC Prosecutor Bensouda gave a briefing to the Security
Council; several Security Council states’ representatives, following the
briefing, continued to assert the proposition that Al Bashir had
immunity from the court’s jurisdiction, thus displaying their continued
lack of cooperation with the court. 55
In sum, as of today, the ICC faces serious challenges which the
court will need to address in order to re-position itself as a fundamental
accountability-providing mechanism in international criminal justice.
The section below will suggest how the ICC should proceed going
forward, so that the court can face a brighter future.

III. Future of the ICC
First, the ICC ‘s prosecutor should continue to build cases so that
she can ultimately prosecute more individuals. As opposed to
prosecuting presidents and prime ministers, the ICC’s prosecutor could
focus on lower level offenders, whose cases may be easier to put together
and where the chances of conviction may be higher. The model for
success here are the Lubanga case, which resulted in a conviction and a
sentence of 14 years, and the most recent Ntaganda case, which resulted
in a conviction on crimes against humanity and war crimes charges.56
According to Professor Guilfoyle, “recent developments largely serve to
confirm the unpalatable lessons I drew earlier from Lubanga: a narrow
case, run against a rebel leader on relatively few (or at least closely
related) charges can succeed. This was the model of success in Ntaganda
. . . .” 57 In Ntaganda, a unified Trial Chamber issued a methodical
judgment which affirmed that the OTP had presented a solid case.58
The Ntaganda case map provide the OTP with a roadmap for successful
future prosecutions: a case built on detailed investigation, arising out
of a single situation, involving a rebel leader, accused of a relatively

54.

Id. (reporting that Al Bashir has been able to engage in 150 trips to
countries such as China, South Africa, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan and
Kenya, many of which are members of the ICC).

55.

U.N. S.C. 7963rd mtg. at 2, 7, 12, 17, U.N. Doc. S/PV.7963 (June 8,
2017).

56.

See Press Release, ICC, Thomas Lubanga Dyilo Sentenced to 14 Years of
Imprisonment, ICC-CPI-20120710-PR824 (July 10, 2012), available at
https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=pr824
[perma.cc/VWX2-N4KU]; see generally Prosecutor v. Ntaganda, ICC01/04-02/06, Decision (July 8, 2019), available at https://www.icccpi.int/drc/ntaganda [perma.cc/X729-PXM9].

57.

Guilfoyle, A Tale of Two Cases – Part II, supra note 21.

58.

Id.
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narrow set of charges. 59 In fact, a deep investigation into crimes
committed by a lower level individual, and a successful conviction of
the same individual could potentially lead toward the imposition of
accountability on higher-level defendants from the same
country/situation. The Yugoslavia tribunal in particular was successful
in this approach: the ICTY’s first defendant was Dusko Tadic, a
relatively unknown lower-level leader of the Bosnian Serbs; the ICTY’s
last defendants were Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic, civil and
military leaders of the Bosnian Serbs. 60 It may be argued that the
ICTY built a successful foundation by first prosecuting lower-level
leaders before reaching for those at the top, and that the investigations,
gathered evidence, and prosecutorial work accomplished during the
prosecution of lower-level cases paved the way toward a successful
prosecution of Karadzic and Mladic. The ICC could follow the ICTY’s
example and the prosecutor could start building cases against lowerlevel defendants for existing situations, which may lead toward the
indictment of leaders.
Second, the ICC’s prosecutor should construct a careful strategy
regarding future case selection, which should include considerations
such as the prospects of a successful conviction, the possibility that the
chosen case and prosecution will lead toward more prosecutions of
higher-level defendants, geographic diversity to ensure that defendants
from all parts of the world are investigated and prosecuted, as well as
any political concerns related to the opening of a new case. When
prosecuting cases, the OTP should ensure that the prosecution is the
result of a long and detailed investigation, based on better in-country
expertise, and that the evidence at trial is presented in a logical and
well-thought out manner.
It should be noted that the OTP has already recognized the two
above-mentioned concerns and has acknowledged the necessity to
engage in more strategic case selection in its most recent Strategic Plan.
In the Strategic Plan, the OTP acknowledged that it should “give
increased consideration to the possibility of bringing cases to justice
that are narrower in scope, insofar as they focus on key aspects of
victimisation, particular incidents, areas, time periods, or a single
accused,” and that it should “consider bringing cases against notorious
or mid-level perpetrators who are directly involved in the commission
of crimes, to provide deeper and broader accountability and … [to lay

59.

Id.

60.

See History, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER
YUGOSLAVIA,
http://www.icty.org/en/about/office-of-theprosecutor/history [perma.cc/BS6R-HGQ9].
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foundations for] subsequent cases against higher-level accused.”61
Moreover, according to the Strategic Plan, “The quality of the work is
an essential element to effectively meet the Office’s mandate and for
the long-term legitimacy and credibility of the Office. If the Office needs
to make a trade-off between the speed, the number of parallel
investigations and the quality of the investigations, then it will
prioritise the quality of its work. With the limited number of cases, it
is essential to achieve a high rate of success in court if the Office is to
succeed in fulfilling its mandate.” 62
If choosing cases which may be politically challenging, the OTP
will need to ensure that the evidence presented is sufficiently strong to
combat any political pressure, as well as to develop a communications
and public relations strategy to combat criticism. As mentioned above,
the OTP suffered a blow earlier this year when one of the court’s pretrial chambers refused to authorize the continuation of the Afghanistan
investigation. 63 When this investigation began, it was relatively easy
to foresee that it would cause political backlash, and if OTP wishes to
pursue such cases, it needs to be ready to present strong cases and to
adequately handle any ensuing political pressure.
Third, certain procedures may need to be revisited. In particular,
the existence of Pre-Trial Chambers, which according to the current
procedures need to confirm charges presented by the OTP, should be
re-examined. Scholars have already advanced this argument: Douglas
Guilfoyle, for example, has argued that “[m]any of the Pre-Trial
Chamber functions could as easily be conducted by a Trial Chamber,
and the confirmation of charges process substantially streamlined,”
because in light of the court’s relatively few active cases, “the Pre-Trial
Division… has come to seem a cumbersome and ineffective mechanism
which is largely a source of delay.” 64 Former ICC Judge Christine Van
Den Wyngaert has also criticized the existence of the Pre-Trial
Chamber, and has referred to it as a “mistake in the legal architecture”
because “instead of accelerating everything, it just slowed everything
down.” 65
Fourth, ICC judges should work on forging consensus regarding
substantive law.
This may entail better communication and
coordination among the judges, an increased sharing of expertise and
61.

The Office of the Prosecutor, Strategic Plan 2019-2021, INT’L CRIM. CT.,
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ideas, and an awareness from all the judges about the importance of
delivering consistent and uniform decisions.
Finally, the ICC needs to foster better cooperation from its member
states, as well as from other states throughout the world. The court
cannot succeed if it surrounded by hostile states, as all of its
investigations depend on the host country’s willingness to cooperate
with the court. As Douglas Guilfoyle has noted, “international criminal
tribunals need powerful patrons to operate successfully” 66 and the ICC’s
future success may depend on better support and cooperation from its
constituents. Thus, it is crucial for the ICC to invest resources into
building strong support among its member states, and throughout the
world.
The ICC is a fundamental institution in the field of international
criminal justice. Its success is vital for this field, and its failure could
constitute an enormous setback. As Jim Goldston recently wrote,
“Perhaps the most compelling argument for investing in a more
effective ICC is that letting it die would deliver a huge blow to the fight
against impunity. Flawed as it is, the ICC remains a capstone of our
centuries-long search for a world in which the law prevails over brute
force. Giving up on it now would set back that struggle immeasurably
and would be a grave disservice to the many courageous activists who
have given their lives for the cause of fighting crimes against humanity
and genocide.” 67

IV. Conclusion
The ICC has served as an agent of impunity since its inception in
1998, and its fundamental role in the field of international criminal
justice as a permanent accountability mechanism remains undisputed.
The court is, however, facing significant challenges which may threaten
its legitimacy. These challenges can be surmounted if the court is
willing to take a hard look at its own procedures, prosecutorial
practices, and judicial attitudes. The ICC’s future may be bright if the
court makes significant changes in the present.
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